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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Community is rapidly developing compre-
hensive strict liability rules for uniform application within the
EC. This development advantages U.S. manufacturers that ex-
port to the EC because they no longer need to comply with the
various products liability laws within each EC member state. A
disadvantage, however, is that while the new EC liability laws
resemble U.S. law, they also depart from U.S. law in many
respects.
This Article explains EC products liability law by first
presenting the principles underlying U.S. products liability law
and then using them to illustrate EC products liability law.
The Article begins in Part II by comparing U.S. and EC strict
liability laws generally and then, in Parts III and IV, compares
the more specific design and manufacturing defect and failure
to warn theories. Part V introduces and discusses the EC's
proposed strict services liability laws. Part VI discusses the lia-
bility of product endorsers and how, if strict services liability
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II. COMPARISON BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY STRICT LIABILITY LAWS
A. Restatement Section 402A and the Strict Liability Directive
Compared
1. General Principles of Strict Liability
In the United States, the principle of strict liability, which
developed in the 1960s, is codified in section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.' Most states have expressly adopted
this principle.2 The general rule of section 402A is that one
who sells a product in a defective condition, thus making it un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or his property
is liable to the user or consumer for injuries or property dam-
age that are caused by the product, 3 and the seller must be in
the business of selling the product that causes injury.4 The
product must reach the user in substantially the same condi-
tion in which it is sold.5 The seller is liable under this principle
even where it has exercised all possible care.6 Whether a prod-
uct is "unreasonably dangerous" depends upon whether the
product has adequate warnings or instructions, 7 and whether it
is reasonably designed.8
In the European Community, a similar principle of strict lia-
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have not adopted the principle of strict tort liability for products.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 694 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
3. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l).
4. Id. § 402A(l)(a).
5. Id. § 402A(l)(b). In many instances, only circumstantial evidence is available
on this point. Such circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to warrant application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to create an inference that the product was, or was not,
in substantially the same condition when sold. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 332-33, 188 N.W.2d 426, 434 (1971) (holding that cir-
cumstantial evidence may be used to demonstrate a product's defectiveness and the
plaintiff need not prove specific claims of negligence).
6. Id. § 402A(2)(a). The seller of a defective product also will be liable to a user
or consumer even if the user or consumer did not purchase or enter into a contract
with the seller for the product. Id. § 402A(2)(b).
7. See, e.g., Parke-Davis and Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1399-1401 (8th
Cir. 1969) (finding that the manufacturer of a drug is obligated to give a valid and
effective warning explaining known dangers).
8. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i. Section 402A employs the cus-
tomer-contemplation test under which a product is defectively dangerous if it is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
19921
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bility is found in Council Directive 85/374 of July 25, 1985 on
the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administra-
tive Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products, otherwise known as the Strict Liability Di-
rective. 9 Article 1 of this directive provides, "The producer
shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product."'
This general statement of liability is similar to that found in
section 402A. Both rules provide that sellers are liable for in-
juries caused by defects in products, irrespective of "fault" or
other concepts of negligence. How closely these principles
parallel each other in the United States and European Commu-
nity depends upon how similarly the key terms under the re-
spective statements are defined.
2. Key Terms Affecting Liability
Three basic terms must be defined to understand the appli-
cation of the principle of strict liability in U.S. law. These are
"seller,"' ' "product,"' 2 and "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous."' 3 Under the EC directives, the relevant terms are
"producer," 14 "product,"' 5 and "defect."16
as to the product's characteristics." See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 99,
at 698.
9. Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Strict Liability
Directive].
10. Id.
11. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. f (applying § 402A to "any per-
son engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption").
12. Id. § 402A cmt. d (the term product includes "any product sold in the condi-
tion, or substantially the same condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate
user or consumer").
13. Id. § 402A cmt. i (an unreasonably dangerous article "must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchased it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics").
14. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 3. The directive defines "pro-
ducer" as "the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material
or the manufacturer of a component part and any person who, by putting his name,
trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its pro-
ducer." Id.
15. Id. art. 2. The directive defines product as "all movables, with the exception
of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into another
movable or into an immovable." Id.
16. Id. art. 6. A product is defective when it "does not provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including ... the
presentation of the product; the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the
product would be put; [and] the time when the product was put into circulation." Id.
[Vol. 18
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a. Seller Versus Producer
It is clear under section 402A that strict liability applies only
to persons engaged in the business of selling products for use
or consumption-manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and
distributors.' 7 It encompasses all entities in the production
process from the supplier of raw materials, to the builder of
component parts to the manufacturer of the finished prod-
uct,18 and extends still further to the wholesalers, retailers, and
distributors of the product.' 9 It does not, however, apply to
the occasional or casual seller.20
The Strict Liability Directive uses the term "producer" in-
stead of seller and defines it in article 3 as follows: "Producer"
means the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of
any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and
any person who, by putting his name, trademark or other dis-
tinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its
producer.2'
This definition is quite similar to the definition of "seller" in
the United States in that it encompasses all persons in the
chain of manufacture, from the raw material supplier to the
retailer.22 Though no reference is made to the casual seller,
article 7 of the directive provides a defense to a producer if a
product was not manufactured by the producer for sale or for
any form of distribution with an economic purpose.2 3 This in-
dicates that a producer, like a seller, must be in the business of
manufacturing the product in order to be found liable.
However, the directive's definition of "producer," like the
U.S. definition, includes more than just manufacturers, retail-
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Leahy v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 507 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986), appeal denied, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1024 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the liabil-
ity of the maker of a component part is dependent upon the existence of a defect in
the component part); see also Western Surety & Casualty Co. v. General Elec. Co., 433
N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
19. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. f. The rule set out in § 402A
"applies to any manufacturer of... a product, [or] to any wholesale or retail dealer
or distributor.... It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business
of selling such products." Id.
20. Id. § 402A cmt. f. "[T]he rule does not . .. apply to the occasional seller of
food or other such products who is not engaged in that activity as part of his busi-
ness." Id.
21. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
22. See supra notes 11 and 17-20 and accompanying text.
23. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(c).
1992]
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ers, and distributors. Sections 2 and 3 of article 3 of the Direc-
tive establish potential liability for persons who import
products into the European Community for sale, hire, or
lease.2" A supplier of a product may also be treated as a pro-
ducer unless it informs the injured person of the identity of the
producer or of the person who supplied the product.2 5 The
scope of this definition is therefore roughly equivalent to that
of "seller" in the United States.
b. Product Definition
"Product" under U.S. strict liability laws includes any prod-
uct sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition,
in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or con-
sumer.26  It does not include services. The definition has
evolved to include food intended for human consumption,27
automobiles,2 8 airplanes,29 power presses,3o insecticides,3 and
products intended for intimate bodily use, such as cosmetics.3 2
Electricity is a product in most states, but supplying electricity
is a service.5
"Products" defined in article 2 of the directive are "all mov-
ables, with the exception of primary agricultural products and
game, even though incorporated into another movable or into
an immovable. '3 4  Primary agricultural products may be in-
cluded if a given member state so chooses.3 5
The definition of a "movable," however, is not clear under
24. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(2), 3(3).
25. Id.
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. d.
27. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913) (discussing liabil-
ity of a food manufacturer for a product which included "a foul, filthy, nauseating
and poisonous substance").
28. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(holding that disclaimer of liability did not protect manufacturer).
29. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 643 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981).
30. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982).
31. See, e.g., Skogen v. Dow Chem. Co., 375 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1967).
32. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958)
(finding liability for a defective "home permanent" for hair, which caused injury).
33. See, e.g., Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.
1988) (holding that electricity is a product); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 501 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1985) (holding that electricity becomes a product only upon
passing through customer's meter).
34. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 2.
35. Id. Each member state may "by way of derogation from Article 2, provide in
[Vol. 18
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the directive. If it is read to mean goods, as defined in the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the term could be read
more narrowly than "product" under section 402A. Section 2-
105(1) of the UCC defines "goods" as "all things.., which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale."36
Many items considered "products" for strict liability purposes
are not necessarily "goods" under the UCC. 7 This interpreta-
tion is more narrow than the U.S. definition of product. If, on
the other hand, the definition is not so restricted, and is taken
literally to mean anything movable, the term may be as broad
as the definition under section 402A. However, even fix-
tures-items actually attached to real property that are not
"movable"-can be "products" under U.S. strict liability
laws. 8
c. "Defect" Versus "Defective Condition Unreasonably
Dangerous"
The phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"
is the most important in strict liability law. It is defined in vari-
ous ways in various states. 39 The section 402A definition pro-
vides that the product must be more dangerous than would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer purchasing it with the
knowledge common to the community. There are generally
three different types of defects: design,40 manufacturing, 4'
its legislation that within the meaning of Article 1 of this directive 'product' also
means primary agricultural products and game." Id.
36. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1977).
37. Section 402A includes "any product [sold] in a defective condition ...if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) [the prod-
uct] is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold." RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l).
38. See, e.g., Begay v. Livingston, 658 P.2d 434 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (heating
unit in motel room); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 386 N.E.2d 1126 (Il.
App. Ct. 1978) (dumbwaiter); DeCrosta v. A. Reynolds Constr. & Supply Corp., 375
N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 364 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1977) (in-ground
swimming pool).
39. See, e.g., Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.
1972); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 402A cmt. g.
40. See, e.g., Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981)
(holding that strict liability principles apply to the design of ajeep rollbar, which did
not withstand back-to-front flip over); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545
S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Ct. App.) (finding manufacturer liable for the loss of an eye result-
ing from defective automobile window glass which shattered into small particles),
rev'd on other grounds, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
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and inadequate warnings and instructions.42 Generally, a
plaintiff must prove that the product is both defective and un-
reasonably dangerous.43
Many courts have found the Restatement's test to be unwork-
able. 44 It is commonly referred to as the "consumer expecta-
tion test" because it focuses on the expectations of the
ordinary consumer who purchases the product. 45 The test is
generally easy to state but difficult to apply. How does it apply,
for example, to obvious defects known to the consumer? How
is the "ordinary consumer" defined?46 Because of such
problems, courts have developed other definitions.
The leading alternative definition is called the risk utility
test.47 In essence, the test calls for weighing the utility of the
product against the risks inherent in its use. 48 Factors consid-
ered include the usefulness and desirability of the product, 49
41. See, e.g., Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. 1978).
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmts, h, j; see also Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725
P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986). Notwithstanding the "strict liability" label, failure to warn
cases are better characterized as decisions based on negligence principles. Many
courts, for example, have held that there is no duty to warn of dangers which are
generally known or recognized. See, e.g., Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d
565 (Iowa 1986) (no duty to warn of danger associated with excessive consumption
of alcohol).
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i. "[T]he rule stated in this Section
applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer." Id.
44. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978) (expressly rejecting
the Restatement approach, which would have required that the plaintiff show the
product was unreasonably dangerous).
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. j. "Where ... the product [or its]
... ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is re-
quired to give warning against it .... " Id.
46. For example, some courts have replaced the "ordinary consumer" with a
"foreseeable user" for the purpose of extending the law's protection to non-purchas-
ers. Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 725 (N.H. 1976) (holding that a child who
lacks the ability to appreciate a dangerous product is still protected under strict liabil-
ity laws). See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 99, at 698 & n.24 (stating that
what would be contemplated by purchaser or consumer may not be contemplated by
a foreseeable user).
47. See, e.g., Macri v. Ames McDonough Co., 512 A.2d 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986) (hammer's utility outweighed risk of chipping).
48. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 99, at 699. "Under this test, a product
can be said to be defective in the kind of way that makes it 'unreasonably dangerous'
if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable
or not, outweighs the utility of the product." Id.
49. Id. The test looks to design and marketing, availability of alternative prod-
ucts, and alternative designs.
[Vol. 18
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the likelihood and seriousness of injury,5" the availability of an
alternative product,5 the ability of the manufacturer to elimi-
nate the unsafe characteristic of the product,5 2 the user's abil-
ity to avoid the danger,5" the user's awareness of the danger,54
and the manufacturer's ability to spread losses through pricing
and insurance."5 This test is most commonly used in design
defect cases where the ordinary consumer would not form an
expectation with regard to a relevant safety feature.56
The concept of "defect" is defined in article 6 of the direc-
tive as follows:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circum-
stances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected
that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole
reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation.5 7
While this definition seems to be more closely aligned to the
consumer expectation test than to the risk-utility test, it con-
tains elements of both tests. On the one hand, the basic stan-
dard is "the safety which a person is entitled to expect, "58
which is quite similar to the component of the consumer ex-
50. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982) (hold-
ing that the likelihood of injury is a relevant factor in determining whether a defect
exists).
51. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957 (3d Cir. 1980) (alterna-
tive design available to make police car more crashworthy); Reeves v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 439 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allegation that alternative design
incorporating safety guard was available for power press is admissible to demonstrate
defectiveness).
52. See, e.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Colo.
1986) (where plaintiff alleged that the oral contraceptive drug was defectively
designed, the court gave jury instructions on unavoidable danger); see also John W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
53. Wade, supra note 52, at 837-38.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. David A. Urban, Custom's Proper Role in Strict Product Liability Actions Based on
Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. REV. 439, 456-58 (1990) (discussing risk-benefit and con-
sumer expectations for defects in design of products).
57. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6.
58. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, pmbl.
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pectation test in section 402A, which provides that the product
"must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer.
59
However, under the directive, the definition of a defective
condition also includes factors such as the use of the product
and the presentation of the product.60 These factors more
closely resemble the risk-utility balancing test because they re-
quire the court to consider the utility of the product and
whether the risks were communicated to the buyer. However
characterized, plaintiffs generally will find it easier to prove a
defect under this definition than under section 402A of the Re-
statement because it is not necessary to prove that the product is
both defective and unreasonably dangerous.
"Presentation of the product" undoubtedly includes warn-
ings and instructions, as in section 402A of the Restatement.
This means that, like section 402A, the Strict Liability Directive
may impose liability where the warnings and instructions on a
product are found to be inadequate. 6' This phrase may also
create liability for how the product is displayed or advertised.
This would be similar to U.S. law dealing with misrepresenta-
tions and the dilution of warnings or instructions.62
Though section 2 of article 6 of the directive makes clear
that a product is to be judged at the time it was manufactured,
and not judged on the basis of subsequently developed prod-
ucts, 63 a producer may not be able to rely on the state of the art
defense under the directive. Article 15, section 1 (b), allows
European Community member states to decide individually
59. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i. To illustrate, comment i sug-
gests: "Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make
some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, con-
taining a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous." Id.
60. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6.
61. See Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7. A defense for a component
manufacturer is that the defect is attributable "to the design of the product in which
the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the
product." Id.
62. See, e.g., Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1992); Mozeke v.
International Paper Co., 933 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1991).
63. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6(2). A "product shall not be con-
sidered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation." See also id. art. 7(e). "The state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time when [the producer] put the product into circulation was not such as to
enable the existence of the defect to be discovered . I..." Id.
[Vol. 18
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whether state of the art will be a defense under the directive.'
In the United States, the state of the art at the time the product
was manufactured is a factor to be considered by the jury in
deciding whether the product is defective.65
3. Defenses to a Strict Liability Claim
There are a number of defenses to a strict liability claim in
the United States. For example, a manufacturer may show that
the plaintiff has failed to prove the basic elements of a strict
liability claim required by section 402A,66 or that the product
has been substantially altered since it left the manufacturer's
possession.67 A manufacturer also may show that the product
is not defective by showing compliance with the state of the
art68 or with government standards.69 This evidence will be
considered by the jury, but will not be conclusive in proving a
defect. A manufacturer may also rely on a statute of limita-
tions70 or a statute of repose 71 to avoid old claims. Of course,
64. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 15. Article 15(b) provides in rele-
vant part,
By way of derogation from Article 7(e), [each Member State may] maintain
or, subject to the procedure set out in paragraph 2 of this article, provide in
this legislation that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the prod-
uct into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be
discovered.
Id.
65. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305-06 (N.J. 1983) (holding
that, notwithstanding the absence of a safer alternative design at the time the prod-
uct, a swimming pool, was marketed, the jury was entitled to consider whether the
risk of injury so outweighed the swimming pool's utility that liability should be
imposed).
66. See supra Part II.A.3. for a discussion of defenses to a § 402A claim.
67. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l)(b). The seller of product is subject to
liability where the product is sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,
and "it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
changes in the condition in which it was sold." Id.
68. See, e.g., Clarksville-Montgomery County Sch. Syst. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 925 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that state of the art evidence is admissible
and represents "the amount or extent of scientific and technological knowledge avail-
able to the manufacturer or seller [of the product] at the time the product was placed
on the market"). Id. at 1005.
69. See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985) (com-
pliance with government standard is persuasive, but not necessarily conclusive, evi-
dence against a finding of defective design).
70. See, e.g., Digioia v. H. Koch & Sons, 944 F.2d 809 (11 th Cir. 1991); Kullman v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 943 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1991).
71. See, e.g., Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1988) (holding
that liability was barred by 10-year statute of repose governing claims for personal
1992]
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the manufacturer may also argue that a plaintiff's own conduct
or misuse of the product caused the accident,72 or that there
were other causes of the accident in addition to, or to the ex-
clusion of, its product.7"
The Strict Liability Directive contains a number of similar
defenses scattered throughout articles 7, 8, 10, 11, and 17. For
example, under article 7(b), a producer will not be liable if it
can prove that the defect did not exist at the time the product
was put into circulation.7 1 If the defect resulted from an altera-
tion, this proof is similar to a substantial alteration defense.7 5
However, it is not clear how this defense relates to a pro-
ducer's potential post-sale obligations under the Proposed
Product Safety Directive discussed below.7
6
The producer also will escape liability if it can prove that it
did not put the product into circulation,77 or that the product
was not manufactured in the course of business or for an eco-
nomic purpose.78 This is similar to a defense under section
402A that the seller is only an occasional seller and is not in
the business of selling the product.79
The producer also is not liable if it can prove that the defect
in the product is due to compliance with mandatory regula-
tions issued by public authorities.80 Professor Taschner and
others have indicated that this provision will be strictly con-
strued and very narrowly applied.8 ' The only possible coun-
injury caused by new manufacturing equipment). A statute of repose limits the liabil-
ity of a manufacturer or seller of a product by setting a fixed time after the sale or
first use of an item beyond which the manufacturer or seller of that item will not be
held liable. Id. at 640.
72. See, e.g., Wilson v. B3icycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1990);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
73. See, e.g., Watson v. Lucerne Mach. and Equip. Inc., 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (finding no liability for manufacturer where death was caused by reck-
less disregard of supervisor's warnings to stay away from a citrus processor which
presented obvious dangers during operation).
74. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(b).
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(1)(b).
76. See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the Proposed Product Safety Directive.
77. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(a).
78. Id. art. 7(c).
79. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(1)(a) cmt. f. Seller "applies to any per-
son engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption . .. [but]
does not.., apply to the occasional seller of food or other such products who is not
engaged in that activity as a part of his business." Id.
80. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7(d).
81. Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules,
[Vol. 18
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terpart in U.S. law is the military contractor defense under
which manufacturers are not liable where their products are
found to be defective as a result of complying with specifica-
tions provided by the military. 2 In the United States, compli-
ance with voluntary standards like those promulgated by the
American National Standards Institute, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, and other groups and agen-
cies is not an absolute defense, but only a factor to be consid-
ered by the jury in deciding whether the product is defective.
Unlike U.S. law, where compliance with state of the art is
merely a factor for the jury to consider in deciding whether a
product is defective, member states that allow the state of the
art defense consider compliance to be an absolute defense
under the European Community's Strict Liability Directive.
3
In fact, all of the defenses listed under article 7 are absolute
defenses. The first sentence of article 7 provides that "the
producer shall not be liable ... if he proves," and then lists six
separate circumstances in which the producer will not be held
liable for damage or injury caused by a defective product.8 4
371 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 81 (1989) (noting that article 7 of the Strict Liability
Directive has been worded to give courts a duty of careful review); see also Hans C.
Taschner, La Future Responsabiliti du Fait des Produits Defectueux dans la Communauti
Europiene, REVUE DU MARCHt COMMUN 257 (1986).
82. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); George E.
Hurley, Jr., Government Contractor Liability in Military Design Defect Cases: The Need for
Judicial Intervention, 117 MIL. L. REV. 219 (1987).
83. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 7 (defenses available to
producers).
84. Id. Article 7 provides:
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this directive if he proves:
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or
(b) that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the de-
fect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the
product was put into circulation by him or that this defect came into
being afterward; or
(c) that the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any
form of distribution for economic purposes nor manufactured or
distributed by him in the course of his business; or
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory
regulations issued by the public authorities; or
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when
he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the
existence of the defect to be discovered; or
() in the case of a manufacturer of a component, that the defect is at-
tributable to the design of the product in which the component has
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Under article 8 of the Strict Liability Directive, the liability of
a producer may be reduced or disallowed when damage is
caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the
injured person or any person for whom the injured person is
responsible.8 5 This is similar to U.S. notions of assumption of
the risk 6 and comparative fault. However, the Strict Liability
Directive does not specify how the reduction of liability is to be
applied or calculated. It is unclear whether a plaintiff who is
fifty-one percent responsible for his injuries will be allowed to
receive forty-nine percent of the verdict, or be totally barred
from a recovery.
Article 10 of the Strict Liability Directive provides a statute
of limitations.88 However, the limitations period depends in
part on existing laws on limitations periods within member
states. Strict liability statutes of limitations in the United
States vary from two to eight years,89 and generally begin to
run when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury.°0 A strict
liability action must be initiated within three years from the day
on which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have
become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of
85. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 8(2). "The liability of the producer
may be reduced or disallowed when, having regard to all the circumstances, the dam-
age is caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person or
any person for whom the injured person is responsible." Id.
86. See, e.g., Vargas v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that
where plaintiff voluntarily exposes herself to a known or obvious danger, plaintiff is
deemed to have assumed the risk of harm and cannot recover), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1304
(3d Cir. 1981).
87. See, e.g., Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984) (hold-
ing that all tort actions are subject to a comparative negligence statute); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) (holding that contributory negli-
gence focuses on the reasonableness of actor's conduct). But see Simpson v. General
Motors Corp., 483 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1985) (consumer's failure to discover or guard
against product defect should not be used as a damage-reducing factor).
88. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 10.
89. See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling
that one-year statute of limitations had run against plaintiff suing manufacturer of
Dalkon Shield); Franzen v. Deere & Co., 334 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1983) (two-year stat-
ute of limitations applies in strict liability actions); Dortch v. A.H. Robins Co., 650
P.2d 1046 (Or. 1982) (eight-year statute of limitations applies to strict liability
actions).
90. See, e.g., Britt v. Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978) (action for selective
wire surgical suture accrued when plaintiff discovered defect); Wojcik v. Almase, 451
N.E.2d 336 (Ind. 1983) (cause of action accrued when catheter broke in body, not
when it was discovered); Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 278 S.E.2d 333 (S.C.
1981) (cause of action accrued at time defective pistol discharged).
[Vol. 18
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the producer.9 1 The statute of limitations under the Strict Lia-
bility Directive is much more generous, because the limitations
period does not begin to run until the defect and identity of
the producer are also revealed to the plaintiff.9 2
Some states in the United States have statutes of repose, but
many do not.93 Under article 1 1 of the directive, no suits may
be brought later than ten years from the date on which the
producer put the product into circulation. 94
Lastly, under article 17 of the directive, a manufacturer may
be able to defend against a strict liability claim by proving that
the product that caused the damage was put into circulation
before the Strict Liability Directive was implemented in the
member state of venue.95 This defense certainly will disappear
over time, but should be quite viable during the early years of
the applicability of the directive.
III. PRODUCT SAFETY AND DESIGN
A. Proposed Product Safety Directive
The European Community considers product safety a basic
requirement to the creation of the one-market system. The
European Community's commitment to product safety is re-
flected in the Proposed Directive Concerning General Product
Safety.96 The proposed directive establishes an overall re-
quirement that no products should present "any risk" or "only
those [risks] reduced to such a level ... considered as accepta-
ble and consistent with a high standard of protection for the
91. See supra note 90.
92. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 10(1). But see id. art. 10(2) ("The
Laws of Member States regulating suspension or interruption of the limitation period
shall not be affected by this directive.").
93. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 11. A statute of repose is distin-
guishable from a statute of limitations in that a statute of repose cuts off all rights to
legal action after a specified time. Kline v.J.I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564, 567 (D.C.
Ill. 1981). This time is usually measured from the delivery of a product or the com-
pletion of work, regardless of time of accrual of a cause of action or notice of invasion
of legal rights. See, e.g., Universal Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla.
1984).
94. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 11.
95. Id. art. 17. "This directive shall not apply to products put into circulation
before the date on which the provisions referred to in Article 19 enter into force."
Id.
96. Council Directive 156/07, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Con-
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safety and health of persons."97 It proceeds, in a rather radical
way, to require permanent monitoring of marketed products to
ensure that no unacceptable risks occur in the use of those
products.98 It also places a duty on the individual countries to
ensure that surveillance occurs.9 9 The legislation covers both
consumer and non-consumer products.' 00 These provisions
go far beyond anything that has been required in the United
States. '0 '
The need for more precise warning labels is clearly deline-
ated in the Proposed Product Safety Directive. Article 3 re-
quires that warnings "provide the potential user or consumer
with the relevant information to enable him to assess the risks
presented by a product when such risks are acceptable as such
but are not immediately obvious and are not insignificant
"102
This proposed directive is clearly supplementary and does
not restrict the applicability of the Strict Liability and Machin-
ery Directives. '" Its impact will be substantial. It inevitably
will result in increasingly severe safety standards being placed
on products. Its labeling and monitoring requirements go far
beyond anything currently required by American products lia-
bility law. Depending on the extent to which risk assessment
or cost benefit analysis is made a part of European Community
strict liability law, the implications of this directive for product
manufacturers, and the impact on their potential liability, will
be significant.
B. The Machinery Directive
On June 14, 1989, the Council of the European Community
passed a Council Directive, 91/368, which concerns machinery
safety.' 0 4 The Machinery Directive provides insight into how
the increased product safety concern reflected in the Proposed
97. Id. art. 2(b) ("safe product").
98. Id. art. 3.
99. Id. art. 5.
100. Id. art. 2(a).
101. See generally Victor Schwartz, The Postsale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in
the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983).
102. Proposed Product Safety Directive, supra note 96, art. 3(2).
103. See id. pmbl., art. 13.
104. Council Directive 91/368 Amending Directive 89/392 on the Approximation
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Product Safety Directive will be implemented. Also, when read
in conjunction with the Strict Liability Directive, the Machinery
Directive has potentially great ramifications for U.S. companies
selling machinery in the EC.
The Machinery Directive creates uniform design and safety
requirements for machinery. It has the dual purpose of pro-
moting safety and eliminating barriers to trade arising from
the member states' differing safety standards. 10 5 The directive
requires manufacturers, or their authorized representatives, to
certify, in accordance with specified procedures, that their
products comply with European Community standards. 06
The precise certification procedures to be followed depend
upon the type of product involved. Certain types of machines
are subject to more restrictive certification procedures.1
0 7
Manufacturers selling products in Europe after 1992 must be
familiar with the certification process.
1. Harmonization and Mutual Recognition
To understand how the Machinery Directive is intended to
operate, one must first understand the concepts of "harmoni-
zation" and "mutual recognition" and how they relate to the
single market system. The free circulation of products, includ-
ing machinery, within Europe requires that the technical stan-
dards used to design and construct those products be uniform
or "harmonized." Otherwise, the differing technical standards
of the member states will continue to be a barrier to the free
flow of goods. The European Community has concluded that
this "harmonization" of technical norms is necessary to protect
health, safety, and the environment.' 08
Historically, the adoption of binding regulations at the Euro-
pean Community level required the unanimous agreement of
all member states.' 0 9 Initially, little progress was made toward
the unification of the European Community because unanimity
was nearly impossible to achieve." 0 Now, the principle of
105. Id. pmbl., at 9-10.
106. Id. ch. II (certification procedure).
107. Id. ch. II, art. 8; see also id. annex IV (listing machinery subject to article 8
procedures).
108. See generally id. pmbl., at 9-10.
109. MARK BREALEY & CONOR QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF
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"mutual recognition" permits the European Community to
proceed by way of directives, such as the Machinery Directive,
which require all member states to pass consistent implement-
ing legislation."' The process of unifying the laws of the Eu-
ropean Community may be compared to a system in the
United States which would require acts of Congress to be ap-
proved by all fifty states. The Machinery Directive is an exam-
ple of the new "mutual recognition" approach to
harmonization, which means that implementing legislation can
contain some local provisions that do not change a directive's
basic provisions.' 12
2. The Directive's Purpose
The clear purpose of the Machinery Directive is to establish
a high level of machine safety for consumers and workers."' 3 It
is therefore consistent with the strong consumer protection
purpose of the Strict Liability Directive." 4 The Machinery Di-
rective is, in part, a recognition that the member states "are
responsible for insuring the health and safety on their territory
of their people.., and in particular, of workers notably in rela-
tion to the risks arising out of the use of machinery.""' 5 The
focus on protecting workers is illustrated by the special treat-
ment given certain types of industrial products." 6 Seven an-
nexes expand upon and implement the thirteen articles of the
directive. "7
The directive seeks to improve machine safety in the mem-
ber states and proclaims that the "social cost of the large
number of accidents caused directly by the use of machinery
can be reduced by inherently safe design and construction of
machinery and by proper installations and maintenance."
'"1 8
In addition, in keeping with the fundamental goal of creating
one market and removing obstacles to the movement of prod-
ucts within the European Community, the Machinery Directive
111. Id. at 48; see also Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. IV, art. 13.
112. See BREALEY & QUIGLEY, supra note 109, at 49; see also Machinery Directive,
supra note 104, pmbl., at 9-10.
113. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, pmbl., at 9-10
114. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, pmbl.
115. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, pmbl., at 9-10.
116. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2), annex IV (imposing stricter certification requirements on
specified woodworking and molding machines).
117. Id. annex I-VII.
118. Id. pmbl., at 9-10.
[Vol. 18
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establishes a certification procedure by which products are
deemed safe and are therefore entitled to be freely distributed
within the EC." 9
In keeping with the goal of raising the current level of ma-
chinery safety, the directive requires manufacturers to take
measures "to eliminate any risk of accident throughout the
foreseeable lifetime of the machinery."' 120 Manufacturers are
also required to inform users of machinery "of the residual risk
due to any shortcomings of the protection measures
adopted," 12 as well as to design the machinery "to prevent
abnormal use if such use would engender a risk."' 122 While
these safety objectives likely will result in increased consumer
protection, U.S. manufacturers must realize that accomplish-
ment of these objectives may require a heightened awareness
of safety issues.
3. The Directive's Scope: What Constitutes "Machinery"
The Machinery Directive applies to broad categories of ma-
chinery. Article 1, section 2, states: "For the purposes of this
Directive, 'machinery' means an assembly of linked parts or
components, at least one of which moves, with the appropriate
actuators, control and power circuits, etc., joined together for
a specific application, in particular for the processing, treat-
ment, moving or packaging of a material."'' 23 Section 2 contin-
ues, "the term 'machinery' also covers an assembly of
machines which, in order to achieve the same end, are ar-
ranged and controlled so that they function as an integral
whole." 24  Machinery also means "interchangeable
equipment."'
125
This is obviously a very broad definition. In determining
whether a particular product falls within the definition, the
breadth of the definition, considered with the consumer safety
purpose of the directive, likely requires an inclusive interpreta-
tion, especially in the absence of other directives specifically
covering the product. However, certain products are specifi-
119. Id. ch. II, art. 8.
120. Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(a).
121. Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(b).
122. Id.





Scott: Product Liability Laws in the European Community in 1992
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
cally excluded from the scope of the definition. These include
lifting equipment designed or constructed for raising or mov-
ing persons, machinery for medical use used in direct contact
with patients, special equipment for use in fairgrounds or
amusement parks, steam boilers, tanks and pressure vessels,
machinery specially designed or put into service for nuclear
purposes, radioactive sources forming part of a machine, fire-
arms, and storage tanks and pipeline for petrol, diesel fuel, in-
flammable liquids, and dangerous substances.1
26
The Machinery Directive does not cover products specifi-
cally covered by other directives. 127 At present, there are spe-
cific directives proposed or adopted relating to a number of
products that probably fall within the scope of the Machinery
Directive, including tower cranes,' 28 household appliances, 
29
hydraulic diggers, 30 lawn mowers,' 3 1 toys,13 2 telecommunica-
tions equipment,133 motor vehicles, 1 34 and agriculture and for-
126. Id. ch. I, art. 1(3).
127. Id. ch. I, art. 1(4).
128. Council Directive 87/405, Amending Directive 84/534, on the Approxima-
tion of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Permissible Sound Power
Level of Tower Cranes, 1987 O.J. (L 220) 60.
129. Council Directive 86/594 on Airborne Noise Emitted by Household Appli-
ances, 1986 Oj. (L 344) 24.
130. Council Directive 86/662 on the Limitation of Noise Emitted by Hydraulic
Excavators, Rope-Operated Excavators, Dozers, Loaders and Excavator-Loaders,
1986 Oj. (L 384) 86.
131. Council Directive 88/181, Amending Directive 84/538, on the Approxima-
tion of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Permissible Sound Power
Level of Lawnmowers, 1988 O.J. (L 81) 71; see also Commission Directive 87/252,
Adapting to Technical Progress, Council Directive 84/538 on the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Permissible Sound Power Level of
Lawnmowers, 1987 OJ. (L 117) 22.
132. Council Directive 88/378 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Concerning the Safety of Toys, 1988 Oj. (L 378) 88.
133. Council Directive 91/263 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Concerning Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, Including the Mutual
Recognition of their Conformity, 1991 O.J. (L 128) 1.
134. Council Directive 76/761 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Motor-Vehicle Headlamps Which Function as Main-Beam and/or
Dipped-Beam Headlamps and to Incandescent Electric Filament Lamps for Such
Headlamps, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 1; Council Directive No. 89/297 on the Approxima-
tion of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Lateral Protection (Side
Guards) of Certain Motor Vehicles and Their Trailers, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 1; see also
Commission Directive 89/517, Adapting to Technical Progress Council Directive 76/
761 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Motor-
Vehicle Headlamps Which Function as Main-Beam and/or Dipped Beam Headlamps
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estry tractors. 3 5
4. Standards and Certification
Article 4 of the Machinery Directive is the key provision for
the elimination of technical barriers and the implementation of
the mutual recognition and harmonization principles discussed
above. Article 4 prohibits member states from restricting or
impeding in any way the entry into their respective territories
of machinery that complies with the provisions of the Machin-
ery Directive.' 36 Article 5 embellishes this principle by requir-
ing member states to regard all machinery that bears a mark
and is accompanied by a declaration of conformity as con-
forming to the essential health and safety requirements of the
directive.'
37
a. Creation of Standards
Machinery manufacturers should pay special attention to ar-
ticle 5 of the Machinery Directive, which controls the standards
by which machinery sold in the European Community will be
judged. 38 At present, there are two levels of standards.
39
The first are national standards and are provided by the vari-
ous member states.' 4 ' The second level is the "harmonized"
or European standards.' 4 ' Since the goal of the directive is
harmonization, these are likely to replace the national
standards.
42
The Machinery Directive assumes the existence of harmo-
nized standards. In reality, harmonized standards have been
relatively slow in coming and are probably not as well devel-
oped as the Machinery Directive anticipated. As a result,
135. Council Directive 89/173 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Certain Components and Characteristics of Wheeled Agricultural
or Forestry Tractors, 1988 O.J. (L 67) 1.
136. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. I, art. 4(1).
137. Id. ch. I, art. 5 (particulars necessary for European Community declaration of
conformity appear in annex II); id. annex II, (A) & (B); see also id. annex I.
138. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. I, art. 5.
139. Id.
140. Id. Member states must bring important, relevant national standards to the
attention of those doing business in the area of the directive. Important and relevant
standards are those necessary for the proper implementation of the essential safety
and health requirements in annex I to the Machinery Directive. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. pmbl., at 9-10 (recognizing the advantages of a harmonized system).
19921
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American manufacturers should be careful to monitor new de-
velopments in the standards. Harmonized standards are being
formulated by two committees: the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Elec-
trotechnical Standardization (CENELEC).'43 These develop-
ments will determine the standards American machinery
products must meet in Europe and will identify the authorities
with which American manufacturers can work to achieve
compliance.
b. Certification Procedures
Article 811 4 sets forth the certification procedures that apply
to article 5 standards and implements the harmonization prin-
ciple. 14 5 The certification procedure to be followed depends
upon the type of product. It varies from manufacturer's deter-
mination of compliance to detailed testing by a properly certi-
fied laboratory.' 4 6 There are two main product areas: annex
IV machinery and non-annex IV machinery. 1
47
143. Id. These committees are recognized by the Commission as competent to
adopt the harmonized standards. In fact, the definition of harmonized standard is a
technical specification adopted by either the CEN or the CENELEC. See id.
144. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8.
145. Id. ch. I, art. 5(1).
146. See id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(a)-(c).
147. Non-annex IV machinery is any machinery not listed in annex IV. See Ma-
chinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8. Annex IV machinery is:
1. Circular saws (single- or multi-blade) for working with wood and
meat.
1.1 Sawing machines with fixed tool during operation, having a fixed
bed with manual feed of the workpiece or with a demountable power feed.
1.2 Sawing machines with fixed tool during operation, having a manu-
ally operated reciprocating saw-bench or carriage.
1.3 Sawing machines with fixed tool during operation, having a built-
in mechanical feed device for the workpieces, with manual loading and/or
unloading.
1.4 Sawing machines with movable tool during operation, with a
mechanical feed device and manual loading and/or unloading.
2. Hand-fed surface planing machines for woodworking.
3. Thicknessers for one-side dressing with manual loading and/or un-
loading for woodworking.
4. Band-saws with a mobile bed or carriage and manual loading and/
or unloading for working with wood and meat.
5. Combined machines of the types referred to in 1 to 4 and 7 for
woodworking.
6. Hand-fed tenoning machines with several tool holders for wood-
working.
7. Hand-fed vertical spindle moulding machines.
8. Portable chain saws for woodworking.
9. Presses, including press-brakes, for the cold working of metals, with
(Vol. 18
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For machinery not included in annex IV, the certification
process is fairly straightforward, relying heavily on the integ-
rity of the manufacturer. 4 8 Unlike products included in annex
IV, which are apparently deemed by the directive to be in spe-
cial need of safety regulation,149 compliance for non-annex IV
products is governed by the decisions of the manufacturer,
subject to policing by the certifying bodies.
50
The manufacturer of a non-annex IV product is required to
"draw up the file provided for in Annex V.' 5 " Annex V re-
quires the manufacturer to compile a technical file consisting
of an overall drawing of the machinery, detailed drawings, a
list of the essential requirements of the Machinery Directive,
and any relevant test reports. 52 This information must be
kept available for examination by the "competent national au-
thorities" for at least ten years- 3 and must be drawn up in one
of the official languages of the European Community.
154
Once the annex V file is assembled, the manufacturer
prepares the European Community declaration of conformity
and attaches the European Community mark.' 55 The Euro-
pean Community declaration of conformity must contain the
name of the manufacturer, a description of the machinery, and
an identification of the applicable standards. 56 The declara-
tion likely will become part of the literature distributed with
the machinery and will also be placed in the annex V technical
manual loading and/or unloading, whose movable working parts may have a
travel exceeding 6 mm and a speed exceeding 30 mm/s.
10. Injection or compression plastics-moulding machines with manual
loading or unloading.
11. Injection or compression rubber-moulding machines with manual
loading or unloading.
12. Cartridge-operated fixing guns.
Id. annex IV.
148. See id. pmbl., at 10. "Manufacturers should retain the responsibility for certi-
fying the conformity of their machinery to the relevant essential requirements ...
whereas it is left to the sole discretion of the manufacturer, where he feels the need,
to have his products examined by a third party ...." Id. pmbl., at 10.
149. Id. "For certain types of machinery having a higher risk factor, a stricter cer-
tification procedure is desirable . Id.
150. See id. annex V.
151. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(a).
152. See id. annex II(3)(a).
153. Id. annex IV(4)(b).
154. Id. annex V(4)(c).
155. Id. annex V(2); see also annex III (replicating the "EC" symbol).
156. Id. annex V (establishing criteria for required conformity declaration).
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file.' 5 7 The European Community mark consists of the Euro-
pean Community symbol, "CE," followed by the last two digits
of the year in which the mark was affixed.' 5 8 The mark must be
attached to the machinery "distinctly and visibly"; marks which
may be confused with the European Community symbol may
not be put on the machinery.
15 9
No additional testing or procedures are required for non-
annex IV products. In essence, the manufacturer determines
whether the machinery complies with applicable standards,
prepares the annex V technical file and the declaration of con-
formity, and attaches the European Community mark. The
penalty for fraudulently certifying compliance is not specifi-
cally set out in the Machinery Directive, but article 7, section 3
allows member states to "take appropriate action" against the
manufacturer. 160 The precise penalty likely will be left to the
member states to determine, but may be criminal in nature.
c. Annex IV Machinery
The directive targets the machinery listed in annex IV as be-
ing in special need of safety certification procedures.' 6 ' This
list of products includes saws, presses, and rubber and plastic
molding machines.' 62 These machines are generally used in
the industrial work place. The industrial worker is thus the
chief benefactor of the safety features of the Machinery Direc-
tive. Heightened regulation will not surprise U.S. manufactur-
ers of annex IV machinery because many of these machines
already are subject to special regulation in the United
States. 1
63
Because of the special concern these products engender, it is
quite likely that specific harmonized standards will soon be in
place for these products, resulting in considerably less guess-
157. Id. Failure to produce the documentation when requested by national au-
thorities may result in a presumption of non-conformity with directive requirements.
Id.
158. Id. annex III; see also id. ch. III, art. 10.
159. Id. ch. III, art. 10.
160. Id. ch. I, art. 7(3).
161. See id. ch. II, art. 8; see also annex IV.
162. Id. annex IV.
163. See, e.g., Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of Occupational
Safety and Health Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 969 (1987); G. Marc Whitehead &
Gregory G. Scott, Europe 1992: Product Liability and the Machinery Directive-What Liabil-
ity for U.S. Manufacturers?, 388 PLI/Lit. (PLI) 63, Apr. 5, 1990.
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work for their manufacturers. However, determining which
certification procedures apply depends upon a number of vari-
ables, including, perhaps, the sophistication of the
manufacturer.
d. The Players
To understand the certification procedures, one must first
be aware of the principal players: the manufacturer, the "noti-
fied body," and the "certifying authority."'' 64 The notified
body is the laboratory responsible for determining whether
machinery complies with applicable standards. 65 Certifying
authorities review the testing data of the notified bodies and
make decisions regarding certification compliance. 66 The di-
rective does not expressly provide for these authorities and
one must read between the lines to ascertain their existence.
The European Community is now taking measures to adopt
criteria for appointing certifying bodies. 167 The likely outcome
is that each member state will have one certifying body analyz-
ing the data of the notified bodies. In some smaller member
states, the notified body may also be the certifying body, re-
sulting in one-step manufacturer compliance.
Article 9 requires that each member state notify the Com-
mission of the European Community and other member states
of its body or bodies approved for carrying out the article 8
certification procedures.' 68 The commission is required to
publish the list of approved bodies in the Official Journal of the
European Communities and to ensure that the list is current. 69 In
the implementation of the certification procedure, manufactur-
ers will likely choose an approved body based on the speed
with which the body can deliver a decision.
e. The Procedures
The particular certification procedure to be followed de-
pends upon a number of factors and utilizes an increasingly
greater level of scrutiny, depending upon compliance with ex-
164. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8.
165. Id. annex VII (providing for the establishment by member states of notifying
bodies).
166. See id. ch. II, art. 8.
167. See generally Whitehead & Scott, supra note 163.
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isting standards, the sophistication of the manufacturer, and
the manufacturer's need for certainty.
70
Where machinery listed in annex IV fails to comply or par-
tially complies with the harmonized standards or if no stan-
dards exist, the manufacturer must submit an example of the
machinery for the full-scale examination set out in annex VI. ,7,
This examination is conducted by a notified body, and compli-
ance must be certified. 72 This testing and procedure is most
rigorous under the Machinery Directive and reflects the direc-
tive's concern about annex IV products that do not fully com-
ply with existing harmonized standards, or for which no
standards exist.
Where annex IV machinery meets a harmonized standard
pursuant to article 5(2), one procedure allows a manufacturer
to create an annex VI file-the same file required for a full-
scale examination-and forward it to a notified body which will
acknowledge receipt and keep it. 1 7 3 At this level, the manufac-
turer is allowed to comply in much the same manner as the
manufacturer of non-annex IV products is allowed to do, so
long as a more detailed technical file is kept. 74 The manufac-
turer must inform the notified body of any modifications to the
product, including minor modifications. 75 The manufacturer
also must create the technical file in the language of the mem-
ber state where the notified body is established or in some
other language acceptable to the notified body.
1 76
Under a second, more stringent procedure, the manufac-
turer creates the same technical file as it would under the first
procedure, but the notified body must first verify that the prod-
uct complies with the harmonized standards and then create a
certificate of adequacy for the technical file. 177 While the di-
rective is not clear as to what will be required for the notified
body to "verify that the standards .... have been correctly ap-
170. Id. ch. I, arts. 5, 6; ch. II, art. 9.
171. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(b).
172. Id. annex VI, §§ 3-4.
173. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(c).
174. Compare id. annex V(3) (describing the technical construction file required for
machinery not referred to in annex IV) with id. annex VI(2) (describing the technical
file required for machinery referred to in annex IV). Remember, non-annex IV man-
ufacturers need only maintain an annex V file.
175. Id. annex VI, § 5.
176. Id. annex VI, § 7.
177. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(c).
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• plied," 17 8 it will undoubtedly require some degree of testing.
The directive is therefore more likely to result in the reversal
of a manufacturer's decision that its product complies with the
directive. The same requirements apply with regard to notifi-
cation of changes.' 79 In addition, a notified body that refuses
to issue an examination certificate must inform other notified
bodies of its decision. 80 This is done so that a manufacturer
cannot go to a different notified body to achieve compliance.
The third procedure requires a manufacturer to submit the
machinery for a full-scale, annex VI examination.' 8 ' This may
be done by a manufacturer to verify its own decision that the
machinery is in compliance or may be required of the manufac-
turer if a policing body believes the product to be non-
conforming.
82
Regardless of which certification procedure is required,
manufacturers must realize that once the European Commu-
nity mark is in place and the certification procedures are com-
pleted, the manufacturer is responsible for complying with all
other applicable directives. The mark must indicate that the
machinery also fulfills the requirements of those directives.1
8 3
Some machinery will likely be governed by other directives.
For example, machinery powered by electricity may also be
governed by the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive.' 84
Manufacturers must be aware of, and in compliance with, all
applicable directives before marketing the machinery.
IV. WARNINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. The Duty To Warn and Instruct
1. United States
In the United States, a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
dangers that are known or reasonably foreseeable at the time
178. Id. annex VI, § 3.
179. Id. annex VI, § 5.
180. Id. annex VI, § 6.
181. Id. ch. II, art. 8(2)(c).
182. Id. pmbl., at 10 ("manufacturers should retain the responsibility for certify-
ing the conformity of their machinery").
183. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, ch. II, art. 8(5).
184. Council Directive 89/336 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Electromagnetic Compatibility, 1989 Oj. (L 139) 19.
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of marketing the product.' 8 5 A manufacturer also must warn
against reasonably foreseeable misuses and unintended uses
that could cause injury or damage. 186 This requires a manufac-
turer to consider the product in the context in which it will be
used, consider the persons who will use it, and determine how
the product might foreseeably be used or misused in a manner
not intended by the manufacturer. 8 7 A manufacturer must
also instruct the user how to operate the product safely.' 88 Ex-
ceptions to this duty to warn include open or obvious dan-
gers, Is 9 commonly known dangers, 9 ° unforeseeable dangers
and uses, 19 1 and knowledgeable users.
92
2. The Strict Liability Directive
The Strict Liability Directive does not expressly create a duty
to warn or instruct. Instead, a duty is implied in the definition
of a defective product. 19  As noted earlier, article 6, section 1,
provides that a product is defective "when it does not provide
the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all cir-
cumstances into account, including; (a) the presentation of the
product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected
that the product would be put; [and] (c) the time when the
product was put into circulation."' 94 Although warnings and
instructions are not specifically addressed under article 6, the
"presentation of the product" may be interpreted to include
warnings and instructions. Warnings and instructions also
may be required if the reasonably expected uses of the product
185. A manufacturer's duty to warn about a product's inherent risk is derived
from negligence law, Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Or. 1963)
(applying Oregon law), but a failure to warn against risks created by a product's de-
fects may also render the product unreasonably dangerous for purposes of imposing
strict liability, Hahn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 805 F.2d 1480 (11 th Cir. 1986) (applying
Georgia law).
186. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
187. Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980).
188. See, e.g., Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn.
1977).
189. See, e.g., Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1987).
190. See, e.g., Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1986).
191. See, e.g., Stabnick v. Williams Patrol Serv., 390 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that defendant had no duty to warn of strong gusty wind, which blew
debris from some unknown place and blinded employee leaving building for which
defendant provided security services).
192. See, e.g., Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 469 A.2d 943 (NJ. 1983).
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involve hazards that do "not provide the safety which a person
is entitled to expect." Therefore, a product may be found to
be defective under the Strict Liability Directive if it lacks ade-
quate warnings and instructions. 9 5
3. The Machinery Directive
The Machinery Directive, in contrast to the Strict Liability
Directive, expressly creates a duty to warn and instruct. 96 The
Machinery Directive requires a manufacturer to "inform users
of the residual risks due to any shortcomings of the protection
measures adopted, indicate whether any particular training is
required and specify any need to provide personal protection
equipment."' 197 The directive also requires warnings "where
risks remain despite all the measures adopted or in the case of
potential risks that are not evident (for example, electrical
cabinets, radioactive sources, bleeding of a hydraulic circuit,
hazard in an unseen area, etc.).' 9 8 It is not clear whether
these warnings should be placed directly on the machine or in
an instruction book. In the United States, manufacturers gen-
erally place the warnings in appropriate locations on the prod-
uct and in an instruction manual.' 99
The Machinery Directive also expressly creates a duty to
provide instructions.2 "0 All machinery must be accompanied
by instructions. These instructions must include certain spe-
cific information, including information required to establish
that the machinery complies with safety certification standards;
instructions for safely servicing, using, assembling, and main-
taining the machinery; and the foreseeable uses of the machin-
ery.20 ' With the exception of the safety certification
information, these requirements are similar to U.S. require-
ments for instruction manuals.
195. See Kenneth Ross & Gregory G. Scott, Europe 1992: Warnings and Instructions
Under the Strict Liability, Machinery, and Proposed Product Safety Directives, 388 PLI/Lit. 49
(PLI) Apr. 5, 1990.
196. See generally Machinery Directive, supra note 104, annex I (essential health and
safety requirements).
197. Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(b).
198. Id. annex I, § 1.7.2.
199. See, e.g., Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.
1974).
200. See id. annex I, § 1.7.
201. Id. annex I, § 1.7.4.
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4. The Proposed Product Safety Directive
The Proposed Product Safety Directive also requires warn-
ings and instructions. The term "safe product" is defined, in
part, as meaning:
[A]ny product which, during its foreseeable time of use,
does not present any risk or only those reduced to such a
level, taking account of the product's use, considered as ac-
ceptable and consistent with a high standard of protection
for safety and health of persons .. .given its composition,
... wrapping, presentation and labelling, conditions of as-
sembly, maintenance or disposal, [or] instructions for
handling.
20 2
Inadequate labeling and instructions therefore render a prod-
uct "dangerous. '"203
Article 3, subsection 2, of the Proposed Product Safety Di-
rective expressly requires that suppliers "provide the potential
user or consumer with the relevant information to enable him
to assess the risks presented by a product when such risks are
acceptable as such but are not insignificant.
'20 4
Presumably, this "relevant information" is to be communi-
cated by way of instructions and warnings. The same warnings
must inform the potential user or consumer of precautions that
can be taken against the risks throughout the foreseeable time
of use of the product. 20 5 Article 3 also makes clear that provid-
ing a warning does not "constitute a means of escaping the
general safety requirement nor a defense when the product
proves to be dangerous. 20 6 This appears to be an acknowl-
edgement of the safety hierarchy; namely dangers should be
designed out, guarded against if they cannot be designed out,
and then warned against as a last resort.
The Machinery, Strict Liability, and Proposed Product Safety
Directives create a duty to provide appropriate warnings and
instructions. This duty is very similar to the legal standard in
the United States. Precisely what constitutes an inadequate
warning or an adequate instruction under the directives is less
202. Proposed Product Safety Directive, supra note 96.
203. Id. art. 2(c) ("any product which does not meet the definition of'safe prod-
uct' according to" part (b) of this article).
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clear, although the Machinery Directive and Proposed Product
Safety Directive do give some guidance.
B. Adequacy of Warnings and Instructions
1. United States
In the United States, the courts have provided some guide-
lines for manufacturers to utilize in analyzing the adequacy of
warnings. For example, it has been held that an adequate
warning is one that reasonably could be expected to catch the
attention of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances
of its use, and one where the content is understandable and
conveys a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger
to that person.20 7 Other courts have defined the message of an
adequate warning as one which clearly communicates the na-
ture of the risk so that the user will understand it, the serious-
ness of the risk involved, and information that will allow the
user to avoid the risk.208 Manufacturers also must consider the
conspicuousness of the warning, the use of symbols or pictori-
als to convey appropriate messages, the location of the warn-
ing label, and the clarity of the warning language.20' Although
the courts have not made any definitive rulings on the use of
pictorials, an American National Standards Institute standard
encourages the use of pictorials that are readily understood,
effectively communicate the message, and provide the viewer
with an immediate opportunity to recognize an existing
hazard.21 0
Instructions affirmatively guide the user in the proper and
safe use of the product. The warnings on the product and in
the instruction book should be interrelated. The adequacy of
the instructions is generally judged in the same manner as
warnings. In writing the instructions, the manufacturer must
consider such things as the ultimate reader's education and ex-
perience, mechanical aptitude, manual dexterity, and intelli-
gence. Also, the instructions should be written to reach the
lowest common denominator. It is better for the book to be
too simple than too complex.
207. See, e.g., Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d
868 (Tex. 1974).
208. See, e.g., Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624 (Or. 1982).
209. See, e.g., Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. 1984).
210. See generally Ross & Scott, supra note 195.
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2. The Strict Liability Directive
The Strict Liability Directive does not expressly describe or
discuss the content of warnings and instructions. Presumably,
an adequate warning or instruction under this directive would
be one that provides "the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account. ' 2 1' The content
of the warning or instruction under this directive is of primary
importance to the manufacturer because the Strict Liability Di-
rective allows a manufacturer to reduce or avoid liability when
the damages are caused in part by the fault of the injured per-
son. 212 This means that a manufacturer could raise as a de-
fense a person's failure to read or comply with an adequate
warning or instruction. The three factors used to determine
adequacy under U.S. law are noticeably absent from the Strict
Liability Directive.
3. The Machinery Directive
The adequacy requirements of the Machinery Directive gen-
erally follow the U.S. requirements quite closely. For example,
the information needed to control the machinery must be un-
ambiguous and easily understood.2 13 Warnings must not be
excessive to the point of "overloading" the operator.21 4 In-
structions for machinery that may be used by "non-profes-
sional" operators must "take into account the level of general




In addition to these general requirements, the Machinery Di-
rective contains a number of specific requirements for the con-
tent of warnings and instructions that may go beyond U.S.
requirements. For example, if machinery is intended for use in
a potentially explosive atmosphere, a manufacturer must indi-
cate that fact on the machinery. 2 6 The instructions must con-
tain the manufacturer's statement of both the normal use of
the machinery and uses that reasonably could be expected.
The instructions must specifically point "to ways-which expe-
211. Strict Liability Directive, supra note 9, art. 6.
212. Id. art. 7(b).
213. Machinery Directive, supra note 104, annex I, § 1.7.
214. Id. annex I, § 1.7.0.
215. Id. annex I, § 1.7.4(h).
216. Id. annex I, § 1.7.3.
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rience has shown might occur-in which the machinery should
not be used. ' 21 7 This is similar to the U.S. concept of warning
about foreseeable misuses, but it seems to go further and re-
quire some type of post-sale updating.
If the machine runs the risk of breakup during operation, the
manufacturer must indicate in the instructions the type and
frequency of inspection and maintenance required for safety
reasons. 2 18 The manufacturer must also indicate the parts sub-
ject to wear and tear and the criteria for replacement.21 9 The
instructions also must contain drawings and diagrams that are
necessary for putting the machinery into service, maintaining
and inspecting it, and operating it safely. 220 These are identi-
cal to the U.S. requirements. The instructions also must in-
form the operator of the installation and assembly
requirements necessary to reduce noise or vibration. 22 1 Lastly,
the directive requires that the manufacturer's sales literature
not contradict the instructions with regard to safety.222
Many of these requirements generally go beyond what
would be required under U.S. law. Of course, these require-
ments will be supplemented by those found in any directive
applying to a specific product.
4. The Proposed Product Safety Directive
The Proposed Product Safety Directive does not contain
specific requirements for the content of warning labels or in-
structions. However, article 3 requires that suppliers provide
the user or consumer with sufficient information to enable him
to assess risks associated with the product that may be accepta-
ble but neither immediately obvious nor insignificant.223 The
supplier must also inform the user or consumer how to take
precautions against these risks throughout the foreseeable life
of the product. 224
217. Id. annex I, § 1.1.2(c).
218. Id. annex I, § 1.1.2.
219. Id.
220. Id. annex I, § 1.7.4.(a).
221. Id. annex I, § 1.7.4.(e).
222. Id. annex I, § 1.7.4.(d).
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V. LIABILITY FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
The European Community is considering implementing a
directive creating strict liability for the suppliers of services.225
The scope of the Proposed Service Directive is very broad, en-
compassing architects to mechanics, day care providers to doc-
tors, playground supervisors to hotel operators, and plumbers
to electricians. 226 The ramifications of this proposed directive
cannot be overstated. It is very important for all service prov-
iders to monitor its progress and prepare for its
implementation.
A. Theory of Liability
A preliminary draft of the Proposed Service Directive begins
with the somewhat innocuous statement that "the supplier of a
service shall be liable for damage caused by a safety defect in
his service." 227 The focus of liability is not the reasonableness
of the service provider's conduct but the notion of "safety de-
fects" and the expectations of the public. 22s The commentary
to the preliminary draft directive made clear that "the aim is to
introduce objective liability on the part of the supplier of de-
fective services, regardless of any concept of fault.
229
Thus, it is clear that the Proposed Service Directive would
replace negligence with strict liability. Presently, article 1
reads:
The supplier of a service shall be liable for damage to the
health and physical integrity of persons or the physical in-
tegrity of movable or immovable property, including the
persons or property which were the object of the service,
caused by a fault committed by him in the performance of
the service.25 °
In addition, paragraph 3 of article 1 clearly states that the
concept of "fault" referenced in paragraph 1 is indeed negli-
225. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Liability of Suppliers of Services,
1990 OJ. (C 12) 8 [hereinafter Proposed Service Directive].
226. Id. pmbl.
227. Preliminary Draft Directive Concerning the Strict Liability of Services with a
Safety Defect, art. 1, (Nov. 6, 1989) (On file with the William Mitchell Law Review)
[hereinafter Preliminary Draft Services Directive].
228. Id. art. 5.
229. Id. pmbl.
230. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(1).
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gence-based. Paragraph 3 provides, "In assessing the fault, ac-
count shall be taken of the behavior of the supplier of the
service, who, in normal and reasonably foreseeable conditions,
shall ensure the safety which may reasonably be expected."
23 '
Thus, at present, the focus of the analysis is on the conduct of
the supplier of the service, not merely on damage and
causation.
B. Scope of the Proposed Directive
1. Who Is a Service Provider?
The phrase "supplier of services" is defined in article 3 as
any natural or legal person governed by private or public law
who, in the course of his professional activities or by way of a
public service, provides a service referred to in Article 2.
' 232
This is an extremely broad definition with few exceptions.
Both commercial traders and public entities are included
within the scope of the definition.2 3 The policy behind the
definition is to ensure that the person who derives the com-
mercial or public gain from a service is held responsible for
their superior technical knowledge. However, the directive
does not apply to public services intended to maintain public
safety, or to package travel or waste services. 3 4 Franchisors
and franchisees are both deemed to be suppliers of services
235
and are deemed to be jointly and severally liable.236 However,
a franchisor and franchisee may avoid liability in certain situa-
tions.23 7 It is not clear whether notified or certifying bodies
provided for under the Machinery or other Directives fall
within the scope of this Proposed Service Directive. As pres-
ently drafted, the directive seems to include these entities, as
well as standards-creating entities.
231. Id. art. 1(3).
232. Id. art. 3(1).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. art. 3(2), 3(3).
236. Id. art. 9.
237. Id. art. 2. The Proposed Service Directive does not apply "to damage cov-
ered by liability arrangements governed by international agreements ratified by the
Member States or by the Community." Id.
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2. What Is a Service?
Article 2 defines "service" as:
[A]ny transaction carried out on a commercial basis or by
way of a public service and in an independent manner,
whether or not in return for payment, which does not have
as its direct and exclusive object the manufacture of mova-
ble property or the transfer of rights in rem or intellectual
property rights.23 8
The Proposed Service Directive does not apply to damage
covered by liability arrangements governed by international
agreements ratified by the member states or by the European
Community.23 9 Unlike the preliminary draft directive, the Pro-
posed Service Directive does not specifically refer to health
care services, presumably meaning they are included within the
scope of the directive.
The term "service" apparently is intended to include the
physical protection of persons and their property, not their
economic protection. Only services that injure the health and
physical integrity of persons and their property are included
within the scope of the directive. This is made clear in article
4, where the term "damage" is defined as
(a) death or any other direct damage to the health or physi-
cal integrity of persons;
(b) any direct damage to the physical integrity of movable or
immovable property, including animals, provided that this
property:
(i) is of a type normally intended for private use and con-
sumption, and
(ii) was intended for or used by the injured person, princi-
pally for his private use or consumption;
(c) any financial material damage resulting directly from the
damage referred to at (a) and (b).2 4°
This seems to mean that professionals such as accountants,
stockbrokers, and attorneys are not covered by the directive.
Protection from financial damage is only provided where there
is also damage to a person or property.2 4'
The preliminary draft directive specifically allowed for re-
238. Id.
239. Id.
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covery of pain and suffering damages. 24 2 The Proposed Direc-
tive does not include pain and suffering within the definition of
"damage" and makes no reference to the issue throughout the
directive.243
3. What Is a Defective Service?
Even though it purported to implement strict liability, the
preliminary draft directive included "reasonableness" con-
cepts. For example, article 5 defined the phrase "safety de-
fect" as a service that "does not provide the degree of safety
which may reasonably be expected as regards health and physi-
cal integrity of persons and the physical integrity of movable
and immovable property including that forming the object of
the service. ' 244 A comment to this article made clear that the
standard to be applied was that of the "reasonable expectation
of the public.
245
The Proposed Service Directive replaces the concept of a
"safety defect" with the notion of a "fault committed ... in the
performance of [a] service. "246 The word "fault" is not specifi-
cally defined. It appears to be a negligence concept, focusing
on the conduct of the supplier of the service.247 The return to
negligence concepts is certainly good news for service provid-
ers. However, the supplier of the service has the burden of
proving the absence of fault.
2 4 8
C. Elements of a Cause of Action
There are two elements set out in the Proposed Service Di-
rective that an injured person must prove: (1) damage; and
(2) a causal relationship between the performance of the ser-
vice and the damage.2 4 9 Unlike the preliminary draft directive,
where safety defects were "presumed" to exist, the proposed
242. Preliminary Draft Service Directive, supra note 227, art. 4(3).
243. Id. art. 4.
244. Id. art. 5.
245. Id. art. 5, cmt.
246. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(1).
247. See id. art. 1(3). "In assessing the fault, account shall be taken of the behavior
of the supplier of the service, who, in normal and reasonably foreseeable conditions,
shall ensure the safety which may reasonably be expected." Id.
248. Id. art. 1(2).
249. Id. art. 5. "The injured person shall be required to provide proof of the
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directive creates no presumption. 250 Once the injured persons
proves these two elements, the burden of proof then shifts to
the service supplier to prove the absence of fault. 25' The in-
jured person apparently does not have to show fault or prove
that the conduct of the supplier was somehow unreasonable.
The supplier of the service has the exclusive burden of proving
the reasonableness of his conduct.
D. Defenses Available to the Service Provider
Under the preliminary draft directive, a number of defenses
were available to service providers. For example, the service
provider was not liable if it proved that the safety defect was
due to a force majeure.252 The service supplier also was not lia-
ble if the safety defect was due to compliance with binding Eu-
ropean Community law, national legislation, or mandatory
rules laid down by public authorities.2 5 ' These defenses are
not available under the Proposed Service Directive. The only
defense apparently available is for the supplier of a service to
prove that he was not at "fault.
' 254
A notion of comparative fault is found in article VI, para-
graph 2, which provides "The liability of the supplier of the
service may be reduced, or even waived, where the damage is
caused jointly by a fault on his part and by the fault of the in-
jured person, or a person for whom the injured person is re-
sponsible. ' 255 The specifics of this provision are obviously
lacking. Under what circumstances will liability be "waived"?
What does it mean to "waive" liability? For what types of per-
sons will injured persons be deemed "responsible"?
The supplier of the service may not use as a defense the fact
that the injured party's damage was caused jointly by his fault
and the fault of a third party.256 Also, the supplier may not
contractually limit or exclude his liability to the injured
person.257
250. See Preliminary Draft Service Directive, supra note 227, art. 6(2).
251. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(2).
252. Preliminary Draft Service Directive, supra note 227, art. 7(1).
253. Id.
254. See Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(2).
255. Id. art. 6(2).
256. Id. art. 6(1).
257. Id. art. 7.
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E. Statutes of Limitation
An injured person must bring proceedings for recovery
within three years of the date on which the injured person be-
came or should reasonably have become aware of the dam-
age,258 or within five years from the date the service is
provided.2 59 However, where the service relates to the design
or construction of immovable property, the five-year period is
increased to twenty years 260 and the three-year period is in-
creased to ten years.26'
V. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF PRODUCT ENDORSERS UNDER THE
PROPOSED DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING LIABILITY FOR
SERVICE PROVIDERS
The term "service supplier" under the Proposed Service Di-
rective may include agencies that certify quality control sys-
tems, certify and endorse products, or create standards for
products.
A. Liability of Product Endorsers in the United States
In the past, U.S. courts have imposed liability upon product
endorsers when a certified product causes injury. For exam-
ple, when a product endorser certifies a product and places it
on its list of certified goods, plaintiffs injured by that product
may claim that the product endorser is liable under a negli-
gence theory. 62 Some plaintiffs have attempted to hold prod-
uct endorsers strictly liable for injuries, but courts have
rejected claims that were not based on negligence. 63
Courts have stressed that endorsers and certifiers voluntarily
assume a duty toward consumers when they enter into the
business of endorsing products. 26 Several theories of negli-
gence have been used to impose liability. One theory is based
on misrepresentation of the amount of testing that was actually
258. Id. art. 10(i).
259. Id. art. 9.
260. Id.
261. Id. art. 10(i).
262. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
263. See, e.g., Toman v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Minn.
1982).
264. See Hanbery, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
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done.265 For example, in Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher
Corp., the court allowed a claim that a product endorser had
negligently misrepresented the amount of testing that had
been done on the design of a defective fire extinguisher.26 6
The plaintiff argued that the seal of the certifier indicated care-
ful testing of the product, even when no testing occurred at
all.
26 7
Plaintiffs also have argued that certifiers and endorsers
should be held liable for negligent testing of products. One
plaintiff claimed that a product endorser failed to discover a
defect in a pair of shoes she purchased in reliance on the prod-
uct endorser's seal.268 She argued that the product endorser
would have discovered this defect with diligent testing. The
court agreed, reasoning that once a product endorser has as-
sumed a duty to test a product, it should be held liable for fail-
ing to discover defects that would have been apparent with
reasonable testing.
2 69
Finally, plaintiffs have argued that endorsers should be held
liable for failure to warn of the dangers of certain products.2 7 °
If a product endorser certifies a space heater, for instance,
courts have indicated that it might be held responsible for fail-
ing to warn purchasers that the space heater is suitable only for
use in well ventilated areas. 27' This theory of recovery places
the greatest burden upon certifiers as they could be held liable
for a duty that is traditionally attributed only to manufacturers.
Endorsers have limited their liability through the use of dis-
claimers.272 A disclaimer used by one product endorser states:
The Subscriber agrees to hold the Laboratories harmless
and to defend and indemnify the Laboratories against any
loss, expense, liability, or damage, including reasonable at-
torney's fees, arising out of any misuse by the Subscriber of
the Listing Mark of the Laboratories or arising out of any
violation by the Subscriber of the terms and conditions of
265. See, e.g., Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D.
Del. 1967).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 111.
268. See, e.g., Hanberry, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
269. Id.
270. Vaughn v. J.C. Penney, 822 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1987).
271. Id.
272. Toman v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Minn. 1982).
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This disclaimer is intended to protect the product endorser
from claims arising from the negligence of the manufacturer
and may account for a decrease in U.S. cases in this area.
U.S. courts have thus held product endorsers liable in prod-
ucts liability cases when the endorser voluntarily undertakes to
test and endorse the product and this undertaking is per-
formed negligently. Once the product endorser undertakes
this duty toward the eventual consumer, the product endorser
must exercise reasonable care in testing and disseminating in-
formation about the product. Courts have found liability
under negligence theories only, expressly rejecting strict
liability.
B. Implications for the European Community
If the European Community implements the proposed direc-
tive, U.S. case law may provide assistance to product endors-
ers, accrediting and certifying agencies, and standard-setting
organizations attempting to analyze their potential liability.
However, because the burden of proving the absence of fault
will be on the supplier of the service, these standard-setting
organizations may have to deal with increased liability.
1. Accrediting and Certifying Agencies
Accrediting and certifying agencies may be liable to injured
persons or manufacturers under the directive. The analysis is
quite simple. Article 1 establishes that the "supplier of a ser-
vice shall be liable for damage. . . caused by a fault committed
by him in the performance of the service. ' 274 If an accrediting
and certifying agency is defined as a "supplier of a service,"
and its activities are considered to be a "service," the directive
seemingly applies, and liability will result from a "fault" in the
service.
Accrediting and certifying agencies clearly are included
within the definition of "supplier of a service," which is de-
fined as "any natural or legal person governed by private or
public law who, in the course of his professional activities or by
way of a public service, provides a service referred to in article
273. Id. at 1019.
274. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(1).
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II. ' ' 175 The term "service" is defined in Article 2 as:
Any transaction carried out on a commercial basis or by
way of a public service and in an independant manner,
whether or not in return for payment, which does not have
as its direct and exclusive object the manufacturer of mova-
ble property or the transfer of rights in rem or intellectual
property rights.
276
The service of accrediting or certifying ISO 9000277 pro-
grams falls within this definition. Therefore, accrediting and
certifying agencies could be liable under the directive if the
ISO 9000 program is improperly accredited and certified and
thus contains a "fault." But, the word "fault" is not specifically
defined. Apparently the directive intends it to be a negligence
concept, focusing on the conduct of the supplier of the
2781service.
Under the directive, unlike under the law in the United
States, the supplier of a service has the burden of proving the
absence of fault. Under article 5, the injured person is re-
quired to prove damage and a casual relationship between the
performance of the service and the damage. Under article 1,
paragraph 2, the supplier of the service then has the burden of
proving the absence of fault, meaning that the supplier's con-
duct was "reasonable" or ensured the safety "which may rea-
sonably be expected."
The liability of accrediting and certifying agencies could
arise in the following context. A person is injured as a result of
a claimed defect in a product. The injured person alleges that
the defect occurred as a result of improper design of the prod-
uct, possibly expressly implicating the implementation of the
ISO 9000 program. The liability of the accrediting agency may
arise in one of two ways. First, the injured party may decide to
sue the accrediting agency directly under the directive. This is
especially likely to happen if the manufacturer is bankrupt, out
of business, outside of the jurisdiction, or otherwise unable to
satisfy a judgment. Second, if the manufacturer is still in busi-
275, Id. art. 3(1).
276. Id. art. 2.
277. ISO 9000 is a quality assurance standard published by the International Stan-
dards Organization. It provides quality assurance standards for design, manufactur-
ing, testing, and management.
278. See Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 1(3) ("account shall be
taken of the behavior of the supplier of the service").
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ness, the injured person will likely sue the manufacturer. The
manufacturer will then determine whether to sue the accredit-
ing and certifying agency for the defects in the ISO 9000 pro-
gram. Manufacturers may therefore decide to bring the
equivalent of third-party lawsuits against accrediting and certi-
fying agencies.
The possibility that a manufacturer would sue an accrediting
and certifying agency raises interesting issues about contrac-
tual terms and indemnity agreements. Generally speaking, in-
demnity agreements are widely used in the United States by
product endorsers. 279 The agreements basically provide that
the manufacturer for whom certification services are per-
formed agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the certifying
laboratory in the event of litigation.
280
Such an arrangement may or may not be possible under the
proposed directive. Article 7 of the directive provides that
"the supplier of a service may not, in relation to the injured
person, limit or exclude his liability under this Directive. 281
This raises the issue of what constitutes an injured person.
Does this mean the person must be actually physically injured
by the service? Could it also include a manufacturer who is
"injured" by a lawsuit brought against it as a result of alleged
problems in the ISO 9000 program? If manufacturers can be
considered injured persons, accrediting and certifying agen-
cies may not be able to limit their liability with respect to them.
Even if manufacturers are not considered injured persons, ac-
crediting and certifying agencies clearly cannot limit their lia-
bility to the person actually injured. This could become
particularly important where a manufacturer is insolvent or
otherwise unable to satisfy a judgment. Even if an accrediting
or certifying agency has an indemnity agreement with such a
manufacturer, it may prove to be of no value to the injured
person.
2. Consultants
The same liability issues apply not only to accrediting and
certifying agencies but also to the ISO 9000 consultants who
279. See Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.
1977).
280. Id.
281. Proposed Service Directive, supra note 225, art. 7.
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work with companies in setting up ISO 9000 programs. The
consultant's advice is certainly a service under the directive,
and it seemingly applies with equal, if not greater, force to
consultants.
3. Product Endorsers and Standards-Creating Organizations
This same analysis may also hold true for product endorsers
and standards-creating organizations. Creating standards for
the design and performance of a product and endorsing prod-
ucts certainly seem to constitute services, and the organiza-
tions creating the standards and endorsing the product
certainly seem to be suppliers of services. Injured persons
who claim that standards were inadequate may try to sue the
standard-setting organizations directly, or manufacturers who
are sued in cases involving allegations of deficient standards
may attempt to sue the standards-creating organization under
this directive. The same is true for product endorsers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new EC products liability scheme borrows heavily from
U.S. law. While there are several technical ambiguities in EC
law, they do not expose manufacturers to unpredictible liabil-
ity. The salient aspects of the EC scheme are its often rigorous
certification requirements and the potential liability for service
providers. While the latter may have little direct impact be-
cause of its apparent consistency with negligence principles,
the former may absolutely insulate manufacturers from liabil-
ity. In addition, combining certification requirements and
strict service liability theories may allow manufacturers to re-
duce their liability exposure through successful third-party
suits against product endorsers.
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